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Review of Medicare Reimbursement Disputes Under
42 U.S.C. § 1395oo: Delineating a Unified Theory of
the Provider Reimbursement Review Board's
Jurisdiction and Scope of Review
David W. Thomas*
INTRODUCTION

The Medicare health insurance program for the elderly and
disabled was created in 1965.1 The Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services (the "Secretary") now administers the
program, in large part under the auspices of the Health Care
Financing Administration ("HCFA"). Medicare covers both medical
facility expenses, commonly known as "Part A7 costs, and charges
for professional services, commonly known as "Part B" costs.
Medical institutions, such as hospitals and skilled-nursing-facilities,
participate in the Medicare program pursuant to provider contracts
with the Secretary.2 Such providers usually interact with the
program through a "fiscal intermediary," a private insurance
company also under contract with the Secretary.3
Once the Medicare program began operations, payment disputes
arose out of the determinations made by the intermediaries.
Initially, a provider dissatisfied with its Medicare payment could
bring an action in Claims Court, asserting breach of the provider
* The author, currently a compliance officer for a government healthcare contractor,
litigated Medicare reimbursement disputes for almost six years as an associate with Nash &
Company, PC., Pittsburgh, PA. While his colleagues, in particular Stephen P. Nash, Terrence
J. O'Rourke and Melissa Staggers, provided invaluable assistance in preparing this article, the
views herein are solely his own and should not be attributed to the firm.
1. Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, Title XVII of the Social Security Act,
Pub. L No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 91 (1965) (now codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc
(1994)). The Medicare program consists of two parts: Part A generally provides coverage for
inpatient and extended care services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395d, 1395r (1997). Part B generally
provides coverage for outpatient and physician services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395w-4
(1994).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (1994). Part A Medicare providers include: hospitals,
skilled-nursing facilities, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities, home health
agencies and hospices. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (1994). In this article, the term "providers" is
a shorthand reference for these types of institutions.
3. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395h.
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agreement. 4 In 1973, the Provider Reimbursement Review Board
("the Board" or "PRRB") was created to provide for administrative
review of such disputes. 5 Pursuant to this process, providers
dissatisfied with the amount of Part A program reimbursement
determined by the fiscal intermediary must exhaust the
administrative remedies before the Board as a jurisdictional
prerequisite to judicial review.6 Thus, the provisions of 42 U.S.C §
1395oo governing PRRB jurisdiction and scope of review are
critical to a provider's ability to obtain judicial review of Part A
reimbursement disputes.
Historically, the Secretary and providers have clashed over
whether the Board conducts de novo review of the provider's right
to Part A payment or purely appellate review of the fiscal
intermediary's reimbursement determination. Providers contend
that 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo empowers the Board to decide all
reimbursement matters for the cost reporting period at issue, while
the Secretary contends that the statute contains an implicit
exhaustion requirement limiting Board review to claims expressly
presented to and decided by the fiscal intermediary.
This article details the history of that dispute from the
Secretary's original narrow reading of the statute to the Supreme
Court's rejection of that view. Also explained are the Secretary's
attempt to breathe new life into the restrictions previously imposed
on PRRB hearings and the peculiar judicial response to the
Secretary's current position - courts of appeals that originally
agreed with the Secretary now adopt the providers' view and
vice-versa. Finally, a unified reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo is
proposed.
I. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE GOVERNING PRRB JURISDICTION AND
SCOPE OF REVIEW

A. The Statutory Prerequisitesfor PRRB Jurisdictionover a Part
A Payment Dispute
Medicare providers report their costs on an annual basis by filing
a Medicare cost report.' The fiscal intermediary audits and "settles"
the cost report by making audit adjustments thereto; thereafter the
4. See, e.g., Whitecliff, Inc. v. United States, 536 F.2d 347 (Cl. Ct. 1976).
5. Pub. L. No. 92-603, Title II, § 243(a), 86 Stat 1420 (1972) (now codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo).
6. See, e.g., Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000).
7. 42 C.FR. § 413.24(f) (1996).
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intermediary issues the Notice of Program Reimbursement ("NPR"),
the determination of total Part A reimbursement due the provider
for the cost-reporting period in question.8 In most cases, the NPR
triggers the administrative review process before the PRRB.
As amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a) delineates the process
through which a provider obtains a PRRB hearing as follows:
Any provider of services which has filed a required cost report
within the time specified in regulations may obtain a hearing
with respect to such cost report by a Provider Reimbursement
Review Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") which
shall be established by the Secretary in accordance with
subsection (h) and (except as provided in subsection (g)(2))
any hospital which receives payments in amounts computed
under subsection (b) or (d) of section 1886 [42 U.S.C. §
1395ww(b) or (d)] and which has submitted such reports
within such time as the Secretary may require in order to
make payment under such section may obtain a hearing with
respect to such payment by the Board, if (1) such provider (A)(i) is dissatisfied with a final determination of the
organization serving as its fiscal intermediary pursuant to [42
U.S.C. § 1395h] as to the amount of total program
reimbursement due the provider for the items and services
furnished to individuals for which payment may be made
under this title [42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq.] for the period
covered by such report, or
(ii) is dissatisfied with a final determination of the Secretary
as to the amount of payment under subsection (b) or (d) of
section 1886 [42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b) or (d)],
(B) has not received such final determination from such
intermediary on a timely basis after filing such report, where
such report complied with the rules and regulations of the
Secretary relating to such report, or
(C) has not received such final determination on a timely basis
after filing a supplementary cost report, where such cost
report did not so comply and such supplementary cost report
did so comply,
(2) the amount in controversy is $10,000 or more, and
(3) such provider files a request for a hearing within 180 days
8.

42 C.FR. § 405.1801-1803 (1983).
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after notice of the intermediary's final determination under
paragraph (1)(A)(i), or, with respect to appeals under
paragraph (1)(A)(ii), 180 days after notice of the Secretary's
final determination, or with respect to appeals pursuant to
paragraph (1)(B) or (C), within 180 days after notice of such
determination would have been received if such determination
had been made on a timely basis.
Thus, the statute imposes three prerequisites for PRRB jurisdiction:
(1) provider dissatisfaction with the determination of
reimbursement or payment due (or the absence of such
determination); (2) an amount in controversy in excess of $10,000;
and (3) a hearing request filed within 180 days of the date the
provider received (or should have received) the disputed
determination.
B.

42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d): The PRRB's Scope of Review Once It
Obtains Jurisdiction

Congress also expressly defined the Board's scope of review
once it obtains jurisdiction over a Part A reimbursement dispute. 42
U.S.C. § 1395oo(d) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Board shall have the power to affirm, modify, or reverse
a final determination with respect to a cost report and to
make any other revisions on matters covered by such cost
report (including revisions adverse to the provider of services)
even though such matters were not considered by the
intermediary in making such final determination.
The tension between the provider dissatisfaction required as a
jurisdictional prerequisite by subsection (a) and the broad scope of
Board review provided for in subsection (d) generated the
"self-disallowance", controversy between the Secretary and
providers.
II.

SELF-DISALLOWANCE: THE SECRETARY READS THE STATUTE TO

REQUIRE THAT PROVIDERS RAISE ALL ISSUES WITH THE FISCAL
INTERMEDIARIES AS A PRECURSOR TO

A.

PRRB

REVIEW

The Agency View: A Fiscal Intermediary Ruling is
Prerequisiteto PRRB Review

a

As practice began before the PRRB, the Secretary advanced the
self-disallowance theory to limit the scope of a Board hearing to
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review of issues that were first presented to and decided by the
fiscal intermediary. The statutory jumping-off point for this theory
is the dissatisfaction requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(i), (ii). The HCFA and the fiscal intermediaries
read this requirement as a mandate for issue-specific Board
jurisdiction and review. According to this view, the Board can only
review issues arising out of a provider's explicit claim for
reimbursement of specific costs, followed by an intermediary's
audit adjustment that adversely affected (disallowed) those costs.
This view is supported by the PRRB Hearing Manual that
discusses the elements of a Board hearing request and requires that
the provider identify the "specific intermediary adjustment items" in
dispute.9 Thus, claims that the provider failed to raise with the
intermediary are deemed to be "self-disallowed" and not subject to
PRRB review.
The initial Board decisions regarding self-disallowance were
inconsistent. In some instances, the Board reviewed reimbursement
claims that had not been initially raised with the fiscal
intermediary.1 0 However, the Board eventually adopted the
self-disallowance theory and supplied a detailed description of the
statutory construction that formed the basis of that view in Mt.
Zion Hospital Hill-Burton Group Appeal v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Ass'n. 11 In applying the self-disallowance theory to refuse
jurisdiction over an issue raised for the first time before the PRRB,
the Board stated:
The statutory phrases "
dissatisfied with a final
determination of its intermediary . . . amount in controversy
. . ." and

"...

covered by such cost report

.

.

."

certainly

9. PRRB Hearing Manual § 1100.131, as reprinted in [1988-2 Transfer Binder]
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
7514. The Hearing Manual has since been superseded
by Chapter 29 of the ProviderReimbursement Manual (HIM 15-1). However, the agency still
requires the provider to identify the fiscal intermediary's audit adjustment that is in dispute
as part of a request for Board review. See Provider Reimbursement Manual § 2921, as
reprinted in 2 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 7701.
10. See St. Joseph Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH)
30,925, at 9,855 (PRRB Dec. No. 81-D13, Feb. 12, 1981) (citing 42
C.ER. § 405.1869: "The scope of the Board's decision-making authority extends to matters
which were not considered in a determination of the Intermediary."); Unity Hosp. v. Blue
Cross Ass'n, [1981-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
31.097, at 10,402
(PRRB Dec. No. 78-D86R, June 2, 1981) (same); Ravenswood Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross
Ass'n, [1982 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
31,945, at 9,605 (PRRB
Dec. 82-D79, April 7, 1982) (same, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d)).
11. [1983-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
32,370 (PRRB Dec.
No. 83-Dll, Nov. 30, 1982).
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indicate that a provider must have made an overt
disclosure-notice of its posture on a particular issue which
ordinarily would be evidenced by claiming reimbursement for
a particular item on the cost report. The regulations clearly
require that as a condition precedent the provider must have
claimed the cost in its filed cost report to give rise to any
controversy. Without any notice of a claimed cost on a cost
report, the intermediary is precluded from considering the
matter and making any final determination for that particular
item which especially applies to self-disallowed costs. The
intermediary's final determination is a statutory prerequisite
for Board (or judicial) jurisdiction. Thus, the Board's
jurisdiction flows from the intermediary's NPR with respect to
the filed cost report, and disputes arising from costs claimed
in the cost report.
The provider's entitlement "to a hearing is conditioned upon
the three subsections immediately following the word "If" on
[sic] the basic section - see 42 USC 1395oo(a) cited above.
Accordingly, the statutory language does require
dissatisfaction with the Intermediary's final determination and
for a controversy to exist. As stated above, the provider must
disclose its position on an issue so the Intermediary can
consider and make a final determination which was not done
in this case. This is essential to Board jurisdiction.1 2
The HCFA's views on self-disallowance were buttressed by the
rule of judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute
committed to the agency's care. 13 Thereafter, the PRRB and the
HCFA consistently applied the theory to deny Board jurisdiction
over issues that had not been expressly claimed in a provider's cost
14
report and reviewed by the fiscal intermediary.
B.

The Provider's View: The PRRB Possesses Broad Power to
Revise the Cost Report

Providers challenged self-disallowance, often focusing on 42
U.S.C. § 1395oo(d) which defines the Board's scope of review to
include matters not raised with the intermediary.1 5 Providers read
12. Id. at 9,841.
13. See, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1982).
14. See, e.g., Part 1I(C) infra and cases cited therein.
15. See, e.g., Ravenswood, [1982 Transfer Binder]
31,945 at 9,608 (discussing

2001

Review of Medicare Reimbursement Disputes

subsection (d) as providing for review of issues whether or not
reimbursement had been claimed before the intermediary. Further
support for the providers' view is found in the opening paragraph
of the statute. While subsections (a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) require
dissatisfaction with the reimbursement determination as a
prerequisite to PRRB review, the opening paragraph of 42 U.S.C. §
1395oo(a) provides that a Board hearing should review a cost
report, not the intermediary's reimbursement determination
respecting that cost report.
Even though subsection (a) specifies the cost report as the
subject of a Board hearing and subsection (d) provides for a broad
scope of review during such a hearing, the HCFA Administrator
continued to apply the self-disallowance theory, holding that the
Board lacked jurisdiction even if the provider reported the costs
but did not expressly seek reimbursement for those costs.

1
6

Thus,

the stage was set for judicial review of self-disallowance.
C. The Pre-1988 Split in the Circuits Regarding Self-Disallowance
Not surprisingly, given the large amount of money that is usually
at stake in Part A disputes, providers often sought judicial review
of the administrative decisions denying Board jurisdiction over
self-disallowed claims. At the court of appeals level, resolution of
these cases fell into three different categories: (1) acceptance of
self-disallowance theory in all instances; (2) rejection of
self-disallowance in favor of broad PRRB review (on a mandatory
or discretionary basis); and (3) rejection of self-disallowance only
in those instances where the intermediary was without authority to
provide the reimbursement or payment relief at issue.
1.

The D. C., Fourth and
Self-Disallowance
a.

Sixth

Circuits Endorsed

Athens II: The D. C. Circuit Endorses
Self-Disallowance as the Proper Construction of 42

U.S.C. § 1395oo(a) & (d)
The D. C. Circuit accepted the self-disallowance theory as a valid
reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo in 1984. Its second opinion in Athens
jurisdiction).
16. See, e.g., Univ. of Chicago Hosp. and Clinics v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n,
35,848 (HCFA Adm'r, April 4,
[1987-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
1986); Kew Gardens Hosp. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., [1985 Transfer Binder] Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 34,488 (HCFA Adm'r, Oct. 15, 1984).
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Community Hospital, Inc. v. Schweiker endorsed the Secretary's
view, declaring that "the PRRB has jurisdiction over costs that are
specifically claimed meaning that the provider requested
reimbursement in a timely manner - as well as those cost issues
raised by a provider prior to the intermediary's issuance of the
NPR.""7

The Athens II analysis of subsection (a) is multi-faceted. First,
focusing on the dissatisfaction requirement, the court stated that it
did "not think Congress intended to permit a provider to claim
dissatisfaction based upon its own failure to request reimbursement
of a cost item."18 Second, the court perceived the PRRB to exercise
purely appellate powers, refusing to construe the statute to allow
de novo Board review of claims newly raised by providers. 19 The
court also noted that broad PRRB review would interfere with the
finality of reimbursement determinations contemplated by the
regulations that provide for the discretionary reopening of NPRs.
The D. C. Circuit perceived the statute to be ambiguous and
deferred to the regulations promulgated by the agency charged with
administering the Medicare program. 20 Finally, Athens II noted that
the PRRB itself had, by then, applied self-disallowance to refuse
21
jurisdiction in at least four cases.
The D. C. Circuit adopted a narrow reading of the power
delineated in 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d). According to this reading, the
PRRB was not granted a broad mandate to examine all aspects of a
cost report. Rather, that subsection only empowered the Board "to
revise aspects of the reimbursement calculation not actually
contested by the provider, and possibly not considered by the
intermediary (because not claimed for reimbursement by the
provider), when such revision is necessary to accommodate PRRB
revisions of other matters that were claimed by the provider,
decided adversely by the intermediary, and then contested by the
22
provider to the PRRB."

17.

743 F2d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Athens IF).

18.

Id. at 6.

19. Id. at 7, citing its own prior opinion, Athens Community Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker,
686 F2d 989, 997 (D. C. Cir. 1982), modified, 743 F2d 1 (1984).
20. Athens II, 743 F.2d at 7-8.
21. Id. at 8 & n.12 (citing Mt. Zion, [1983-1 Transfer Binder] 32,370, the PRRB Letter
in Case No. 82-109 and two other unreported PRRB jurisdictional decisions).
22.

Id. at 9.
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b. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits Follow the D.C. Circuit's
Lead
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed the D.
C. Circuit's lead in accepting the self-disallowance reading of 42
U.S.C. § 1395oo. 23 The court, ascribing a purely appellate review
role to the Board, held that "a provider must affirmatively place an
issue in controversy at the time it files its cost report in order to
24
preserve its ability to appeal the matter to the PRRB."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit not only endorsed
self-disallowance, it extended the application of the implicit
exhaustion requirement that is the foundation of the theory.25 Fiscal
intermediaries must follow the Medicare regulations. 26 Thus, it
would be futile to challenge the validity of a regulation in a filing
submitted to the intermediary However, the Sixth Circuit applied
self-disallowance to such claims, even though it recognized that the
application of the theory in such circumstances did not serve the
policies that generally underlie the exhaustion doctrine because the
intermediary cannot offer any remedy regarding a challenge to the
validity of a regulation. 27
2.

The First, Seventh and Ninth Circuits Reject
Self-Disallowance

The Secretary's self-disallowance interpretation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo was not well received in other circuits. While analyzing
the question differently, the Courts of Appeals for the First,
Seventh and Ninth Circuits all rejected self-disallowance.
a.

The First Circuit: The Board Has Discretionary
Authority to Review Self-Disallowed Claims

The First Circuit's St. Luke's Hospital v. Secretary of Health and
23. Community Hosp. of Roanoke Valley v. Health and Human Serv., 770 F.2d 1257,
1261-64 (4th Cir. 1985).
24. Id. at 1262-63 (footnote omitted).
25. Saline Community Hosp. Ass'n v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 744 F.2d 517,
518 (6th Cir. 1984).
26. 42 C.YR. § 421.100(h) (1991).
27. Baptist Hosp. East v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 802 F2d 860, 864-65
(6th Cir. 1986). Subsequently, another Sixth Circuit panel expressed reservations regarding
the application of self-disallowance in instances where the fiscal intermediary could not
award the relief granted, but was bound to follow Baptist Hospital. Bethesda Hosp. v.
Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 810 E2d 558, 561-62 (6th Cir. 1987), rev'd sub nom.
Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399 (1988).
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Human Services decision rejected the self-disallowance theory of
PRRB jurisdiction.28 Initially, the court recognized that the Board is
not solely an appellate review entity. Specifically, the court noted
that the Board's role is hybrid in nature - its initial fact-fimding
functions of receiving testimony, cross-examination and new
evidence necessarily imply review of some claims raised for the
first time at the Board level. 29 St. Luke's also questioned the
Secretary's apparent presumption that Congress intended only
limited review of a private entity's decision as to the disbursement
30
of public funds.
The First Circuit disagreed with the limited reading accorded 42
U.S.C. § 1395oo(d) by the D. C. Circuit in Athens II. The court held
that the plain language of subsection (d), which expressly permits
the Board to "consider matters not brought to the intermediary's
attention," provides for broad PRRB review. 31 St. Luke's, however,
analogizing to the limited instances wherein appellate courts will
review issues not raised before the trial court, held this power was
discretionary and should be exercised sparingly by the Board, thus
defusing concerns of adverse practical consequences. 32 Proper
exercise of the discretionary power specified in subsection (d)
would prevent review, in hearings triggered by reopening decisions,
of issues that were not reconsidered during the reopening.
The First Circuit also rejected the Secretary's plea for judicial
deference to the agency's reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo. First, the
statutory language was unambiguous, precluding judicial deference
to the agency's interpretation.34 Second, deference is proper only
when the agency has consistently set forth its interpretation; given
the Board's vacillating stance on self-disallowance, deference was
not due in this instance.35 Further, 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(e) grants the
Board the power to make rules governing its procedure. Thus, the
Board's ability to regulate the exercise of its broad scope of review
28. 810 F.2d 325, 332 (1st Cir. 1987).
29. Id. at 328-29.
30. Id. at 329.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 329-30. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit's worries regarding broad review of
post-reopening revised NPRs is refuted by the pertinent regulation, which specifies that such
revised NPRs are separate and distinct determinations. See 42 C.YR. § 405.1889 (2000). As
explained below, the case law now is clear that, on appeal from such revised NPRs,
providers can only raise issues that were revised or reconsidered during the reopening. See
discussion at Part V(C)(1), infra.
34. St. Luke's, 810 F2d at 331 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45).
35. Id.
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eliminated any need to read the statute as precluding review of
newly raised issues.36 Finally, St. Luke's noted that deference
cannot be employed to frustrate a congressional purpose and held
that "[t]o interpret this statute as denying the Board the power to
hear issues not raised below seems wrong, to the point where any
to the administrator's interpretation simply
additional 'weight' given
37
day."
the
carry
cannot
b.

The Seventh Circuit: 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d) Requires
Rejection of Self-Disallowance

The Seventh Circuit rejected self-disallowance in St. Mary of
Nazareth Hospital Center v. Department of Health and Human
Services.3 Focusing almost exclusively on 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d),
the court agreed with providers that the plain language of that
provision "allows the Board to consider matters outside of the cost
39
reports" as filed with the intermediaries.
c. The Ninth Circuit: The Board Must Hear Self-Disallowed
Claims
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit employed a
different approach to reject self-disallowance in Adams House
Health Care v. Heckler.40 First, the court held that the plain
language of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d) empowered the Board to review
matters not presented to the fiscal intermediary. 4' The Ninth Circuit
also rejected the Secretary's inference that the dissatisfaction
required by subsection (a)(1)(A) was an implicit mandate that
providers first present every reimbursement claim to the
intermediary: "Section (a) requires that a provider be dissatisfied
with the total amount of reimbursement offered by an intermediary,
not with the intermediary's reasoning with respect to any specific
42

CoSts."

The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by the D. C. Circuit's
concerns about potential adverse consequences of expansive Board
36. Id. at 331-32.
37. Id. at 332 (citing, inter alia, FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454
U.S. 27, 32 (1981)).
38. 698 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983).
39. St. Mary's, 698 F2d at 1346.
40. 817 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 485 U.S. 1018, (1988), and
affd after remand, 862 F.2d 1371 (1988).
41. Adams House, 817 F2d at 591.
42. Id. at 592.
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review. Concerns as to frivolous provider claims were baseless
because the Medicare Act contains antifraud provisions.4 Concerns
that the Board would not have the benefit of the fiscal
intermediary's input were rectified by the Board's hybrid function
of initial fact-finding and review." Finally, broad PRRB jurisdiction
would not vitiate the cost report filing deadline because the timely
filing of an original or supplemental cost report is a prerequisite to
a Board hearing. 45 The Adams House panel also found that, as the
Board was granted appellate and de novo fact-fimding powers, there
was no conflict between broad Board review and the reopening
process.

46

The Ninth Circuit also refused to defer to the agency's
interpretation. Adams House echoed St. Luke's, which refused
deference because of the Board's inconsistency in applying
self-disallowance, and further noted that the judiciary, not the
agency, possesses the requisite expertise as to jurisdictional
questions.4 Thus deference was not proper in this instance.
Finally, construing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395oo(a) and (d) together, the
Adams House court concluded that the Board must hear new
issues raised by providers. The court noted that subsection (d)
defines the Board's powers once a hearing is properly requested. 48
If a provider has met subsection (a)'s jurisdictional prerequisites,
the Board has no power to refuse to hear issues that were not first
presented to the intermediary.49 The Adams House decision
presents the broadest view of jurisdiction and scope of review in
PRRB cases.
3.

The Eleventh Circuit's Bifurcated View
Self-Disallowance

of

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted a
bifurcated analysis of the self-disallowance question. Initially, the
Eleventh Circuit adopted the Athens II reading of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo in North Broward Hospital District v. Bowen. 5° The
43. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn).
44. Id. at 592-93 (citing St. Luke's, 810 F.2d at 328). Moreover, the fiscal intermediary is
a party to all Board hearings. See 42 C.FR. § 405.1843 (2000). Thus, the Board will hear the
intermediary's views regarding all reimbursement matters at issue in a PRRB hearing.
45. Adams House, 817 F2d at 593.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 593-94.
48. Id. at 594.
49. Id.
50. 808 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 485 U.S. 1018 (1988), and
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North Broward panel viewed the PRRB as exercising only
appellate, not de novo review powers. "The reimbursement review
procedure is modeled after the civil litigation procedure, and the
PRRB's review of the fiscal intermediary's decision is limited in the
same manner as an appellate court's review of a trial decision: The
claim had to be brought at the initial hearing to be recognized on
5
appeal." '
However, the Eleventh Circuit later carved out an exception in
Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center v. Bowen, focusing
on the type of claim that had been self-disallowed.5 The
Tallahassee Memorial panel held that, if the fiscal intermediary
could award reimbursement of the costs at issue, North Broward
controlled and the provider must present the claim to the
intermediary in order to preserve it for Board review.5 However,
the Eleventh Circuit recognized that certain reimbursement issues,
such as challenges to the validity of a regulation, were beyond the
intermediary's authority.m The court examined the legislative
history of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo, noting that the 1980 amendments
thereto added a provision whereby providers could avoid
exhausting fruitless administrative remedies if the agency was
without authority to rule in the provider's favor.5 5 The court found
that the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d) was irrelevant because
the 1980 amendment only referred to 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a). 56 Freed
from stare decisis as to the North Broward decision, which
focused on subsection (d), the Tallahassee Memorial panel held
that the PRRB could hear self-disallowed challenges to the validity
of Medicare regulations.5
opinion after remand, 850 F2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1988).
51. North Broward, 808 F2d at 1409 n.6.
52. 815 E2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1020 (1988).
53. Tallahassee Mee'l, 815 F2d at 1457-58.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1459-60 (citing Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 955,
94 Stat. 2599, 2647-48). The 1980 amendments permit what is commonly referred to as
"expedited judicial review." See 42 C.YR. § 405.1842 (2000).
56. Tallahassee Mem'l, 815 F.2d at 1461.
57. Id. at 1463. While the distinction drawn in Tallahassee Memorial is valid, the
analysis seems incomplete. Assuming that 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d) has no bearing on an issue
subject to the expedited judicial review process created by the 1980 amendment to
subsection (f)(1), the court acknowledged that the key to expedited review was satisfaction
of the requirements of subsection (a). Id. And North Broward adopted the D. C. Circuit's
view, announced in Athens II, that self-disallowance was the proper reading of subsection
(a). Thus, Tallahassee Memorial arguably should have, but did not, analyze the
"dissatisfaction" requirement.
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BETHESDA: THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE
SELF-DISALLOWANCE THEORY

The Supreme Court examined this split in the circuits in
Bethesda Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen. 8 The Court acknowledged that
the self-disallowance theory is grounded in the view that the
dissatisfaction mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(A) is an
implicit requirement that providers exhaust the administrative
remedies available at the intermediary level prior to seeking PRRB
review.59 Bethesda employs a tripartite analysis, examining the
dissatisfaction requirement of subsection (a), the broad scope of
review granted the Board by subsection (d) and the Board's role in
expedited judicial review cases under subsection (f)(1). After
analyzing the statute as a whole, the Court rejected
self-disallowance as a "strained interpretation... inconsistent with
the express language of the statute. "60
A.

The DissatisfactionRequired by 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)

The type of reimbursement claim brought by the providers in the
case sub judice, a challenge to the validity of a regulation, drove
the Bethesda analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a). 1 Although agreeing
that "a provider's dissatisfaction with the amount of total
reimbursement is a condition to the Board's jurisdiction" and
acknowledging that a hypothetical provider's failure to initially
request permissible payment might preclude such dissatisfaction,
the Court recognized that this analysis did not apply if the provider
challenged a regulation.62 As the intermediaries are without
authority to "award reimbursement except as the regulations
provide . . . any attempt to persuade the intermediary to do
otherwise would be futile."6 The Court concluded that, given the
intermediary's inability to provide relief in cases challenging the
validity of a regulation, providers in such cases "could claim
dissatisfaction, within the meaning of the statute, without
incorporating their challenge in the cost reports filed with their
fiscal intermediaries."6
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

485 U.S. 399 (1988).
Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 401-02.
Id. at 404-05.
Id. at 404.
Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 405.
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B. The Proper Construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d)
Although the analysis of subsection (a) revolved around the
specific facts presented, the Court's interpretation of the scope of
review mandated by subsection (d) is more broad-based:
While the express language of subsection (a) requires the
result we reach in the present case, our conclusion is also
supported by the language and design of the statute as a
whole . . . . Section 1395oo(d), which sets forth the powers
and duties of the Board once its jurisdiction has been invoked,
explicitly provides that in making its decision whether to
affirm, modify, or reverse the intermediary's decision, the
Board can "make any other revisions on matters covered by
such cost report . . . even though such matters were not
considered by the intermediary in making such final
determination." This language allows the Board, once it
obtains jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a), to review and
revise a cost report with respect to matters not contested
before the fiscal intermediary. The only limitation prescribed
by Congress is that the matter must have been "covered by
such cost report," that is, a cost or expense that was incurred
within the period for which the cost report was filed, even if
such cost or expense was not expressly claimed.6
C.

The Roles of the Board and the Intermediary Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo(f)(1)

Finally, again turning to the specific claim at issue, a regulatory
challenge subject to expedited judicial review under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo(f)(1), the Court distinguished the roles of the Board and
the fiscal intermediaries. The fiscal intermediary has no authority
regarding claims subject to expedited judicial review and plays no
part in shaping the controversy for judicial review.6 While the
Board is also without authority to rule on a challenge to the
validity of a regulation, its role is different: The Board must
determine whether the issue is beyond its authority and, thus,
proper for expedited judicial review. 67 Given these different roles,
the Court concluded that it was unnecessary to first present
65. Id. at 405-06 (internal citation omitted).
66. Id. at 406-07.
67. Id.
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regulatory challenges to the intermediaries.6
IV.

INTERPRETATIONS OF BETHESDA BY THE JUDICIARY AND THE
SECRETARY

A.

The Initial Interpretation of Bethesda by the Courts Of
Appeals

In conjunction with its Bethesda decision, the Supreme Court
granted certiorariin three other cases, vacated the decisions of the
Courts of Appeals therein, and remanded the cases for further
review in light of Bethesda.69 The post-remand decisions in those
cases by the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth, Eleventh and Sixth
Circuits represent the first application of Bethesda.
1.

The Ninth Circuit's Second Adams House Decision

Following the remand, the Ninth Circuit again considered PRRB
jurisdiction in view of the facts at issue in Adams House.70 Rather
than challenging a regulation, the provider therein challenged an
interpretive guideline published by the HCFA in the Provider
Reimbursement Manual.71 The Ninth Circuit held this difference to
be inconsequential; by submitting its cost report in accordance with
the Manual, the provider followed the Secretary's instructions. As
the Supreme Court noted in Bethesda, "the submission of a cost
report in full compliance with the unambiguous dictates of the
Secretary's rules and regulations does not, by itself, bar the
provider from claiming dissatisfaction with the amount of
reimbursement allowed ....
Having concluded that the dissatisfaction requirement of
subsection (a) did not preclude PRRB jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit
followed the Supreme Court's lead in analyzing the entire statute to
determine the scope of PRRB review in the case. 73 The court
concluded that, under subsection (d), once the PRRB obtains
jurisdiction, it has the power to review matters covered by the cost
report regardless of whether the precise issues were first raised
68. Id. at 407.
69. Bowen v. Adams House Health Care, 485 U.S. 1018 (1988); North Broward Hosp.
Dist. v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 1018 (1988); Univ. of Cincinnati v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 1018 (1988).
70. 862 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1988).
71. Id. at 1374-75.
72. Id. at 1375 (quoting Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 404).
73. Id.
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with the intermediary.7 4 The provider need only reflect the cost in
75
the cost report to ensure PRRB review of the claim.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit relied on yet another provision of
the statute to uphold PRRB review of claims not presented to the
fiscal intermediary. While dissatisfaction with the intermediary's
determination is a jurisdictional prerequisite, the PRRB does not
review the determination. Rather, the opening paragraph of
subsection (a) specifies that the provider obtains a hearing with
respect to the cost report.7 6 Once the dissatisfaction requirement
was satisfied, the PRRB could review all matters covered by the
cost report, regardless of whether the precise nature of the claim
was previously disclosed to the intermediary.77
2. The Eleventh Circuits Post-Remand Decision in North
Broward
As the Eleventh Circuit's subsequent description in Tallahassee
Memorial makes clear, North Broward involved a claim that,
although subject to intermediary authority, the providers
"inexplicably failed to raise with their intermediaries." 78 Thus,
rather than filing a cost report in accordance with rules precluding
reimbursement then challenging the rules, the North Broward
providers failed to claim costs that were reimbursable under the
existing rules. However, in its post-remand North Broward
decision, the court sub silentio disregarded this fact, finding that
"it would have been useless for the provider to have made a claim
before the fiscal intermediary ... ."7 As this characterization was
on all-fours with Bethesda, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
claim was within the Board's jurisdiction and thus subject to
judicial review.80
3.

The Sixth
Bethesda

Circuits Post-Remand Interpretation of

The facts at issue in University of Cincinnati v. Bowen must be
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1375-76 (citing Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 405-06).
76. Id. The court expressly reserved the question of whether the Board could review
claims as to costs completely omitted from the cost report. Id. at n.3.
77. In addition, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its prior Adams House ruling, finding that
the Board must exercise its power to review claims under subsection (d). Id. at 1375-76.
78. 815 F2d at 1457 (citing North Broward, 808 F.2d at 1405 n.2).
79. 850 F.2d 1548, 1549 (11th Cir. 1988).
80.

Id.
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derived from a review of a number of decisions. The case involved
claims for medical education costs for three separate cost-reporting
periods, arising out of the provider's "mistaken belier as to
whether the costs were reimbursable.8' This original description is
ambiguous as to whether the provider claimed that a
reimbursement rule or regulation was invalid or merely failed to
claim payment for the costs.
However, a subsequent opinion addressing the same provider's
claim for reimbursement of the identical costs for later years
clearly defined the nature of the claim. Rather than a challenge to a
regulation or rule that precluded reimbursement, the provider
challenged the intermediary's interpretation and application of the
regulation to disallow its claimed costs.8 2 Thus illuminated, the first
University of Cincinnati decision addressed reimbursement claims
apparently subject to the intermediary's authority.
Following Bethesda, the Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished and
3
unreported memorandum opinion, vacated its original decision.8
Therefore, it appears that the Sixth Circuit followed the second
prong of the Bethesda analysis and found the issue properly before
the Board.
B. The Secretary's Restrictive Reading of Bethesda
1.

The HCFA's Attempts to Limit the Extent of Bethesda

From the moment the decision was handed down, the HCFA has
attempted to limit Bethesda to instances where it would have been
futile for the provider to first present the issue to the intermediary.
As the HCFA Administrator stated in 1990, if there "was no
regulation or other agency policy that directed the Provider not to
claim these costs on its cost report," the Board lacked jurisdiction
to review the provider's claim that the costs should be
reimbursed.84 Thereafter, the HCFA consistently held that Bethesda
is limited to cases where the intermediary is without authority to
address the provider's claim.8 Initially, the HCFA Administrator did
81. Univ. of Cincinnati v. Bowen, 809 F2d 307, 308 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987).
82. Univ. of Cincinnati v. Bowen, 875 F2d 1207, 1208 (6th Cir. 1989). See also Univ.
Hosp. v. Bowen, [1988-2 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
37,055 (S.D.
Ohio No. C-1-87-0039, March 25, 1988).
83. 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH), Medicare Case Table, at 379 (June 25, 1998).
84. Somerset Rehabilitation P.C. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, (1990 Transfer
Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
38,661, at 23,816 (HCFA Adm'r, Aug. 16, 1990).
.85. See, e.g., Bon Secours Heartlands Home Health Agency v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Ass'n, [1993-2 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
41,690 (HCFA Adm'r,
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not address the Bethesda discussion of subsection (d).86 Later
decisions disparagingly characterize the provider's reliance on
subsection (d) as an attempt to impermissibly bootstrap an
untimely presented claim onto a properly presented appeal.87 Even
when citing Bethesda, such later agency decisions do not address
the Supreme Court's statement that "[t]he only limitation prescribed
by Congress is that the matter must have been 'covered by the cost
report,' that is, a cost or expense that was incurred within the
period for which the cost report was filed, even if such cost or
expense was not expressly claimed." 8 This failure to fully address
Bethesda undermines the HCFA:s current analysis.
2. The PRRB3's Inconsistent Readings of Bethesda
The PRRB's post-Bethesda decisions are in conflict. In some
instances, the PRRB follows the HCF's lead and holds that
Bethesda only applies where it would have been futile to first raise
the issue with the intermediary89 In other instances, the PRRB
holds that self-disallowed claims that could have been presented to
and decided by the intermediary are within its jurisdiction and
scope of review.90 As with the early HCFA decisions, any discussion
of subsection (d) is noticeably absent from the Board decisions
that limit Bethesda to instances where it would have been futile for
the provider to raise the issue with the intermediary. When the
Board hears a self-disallowed claim, it may cite the Bethesda
discussion of subsection (d) as the source of its jurisdiction. 91
C. The Second Wave of Judicial Interpretationof Bethesda
As noted above, the initial judicial application of Bethesda
Aug. 23, 1993); Little Co. of Mary Hosp. and Health Care Ctrs. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Ass'n, [1997-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
45,233 (HCFA Adm'r,
Apr. 4, 1997); Conemaugh Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, [1999-1
Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
80,126 (HCFA Adm'r, Nov. 16, 1998),
appeal pending, Conemaugh Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Shalala, D.D.C No. 1:99 CV00135 (RWR).
86. See, e.g., Bon Secours, [1993-2 Transfer Binder] 41,690 at 37,336-37.
87. See, e.g.,Conemaugh, [1999-1 Transfer Binder] (CCH)
80,126 at 200,483.
88. Compare id. at n.4, with Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 406.
89. See, e.g., St. Joseph Health Ctr. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, [1997-2 Transfer
Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
45,485 (PRRB Dec. No. 97-277, July 2, 1997).
90. See St. Vincent Health Ctr v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, PRRB Case No.
91-0035, 3/18/97 Jurisdictional Ruling (on file with the author); Conemaugh Valley Mem'l
Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, [1998-2 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH)
80,074 (PRRB Dec. No. 98-D94, Sept. 15, 1998), vacated, [1999-1 Transfer
Binder] 80,126 (HCFA Adn'r, Nov. 16, 1998), appeal pending.
91. See Conemaugh, [1998-2 Transfer Binder]
80,067 at 200,380.
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occurred in cases remanded for reconsideration in 1988, all of
which dealt with the intermediary's original determination of the
amount of reimbursement due for the cost-reporting periods in
question. The second wave of judicial opinions interpreting PRRB
jurisdiction and scope of review under Bethesda is more expansive,
generally addressing three separate fact patterns: Board hearings
triggered by (1) revised NPRs; (2) original NPRs; and (3)
intermediary refusals to reopen NPRs. In virtually every case, the
decision turns upon whether the reimbursement determination that
triggered the request for a Board hearing is a determination
explicitly described in 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a).
1.

Later Judicial Interpretations of the Impact of Bethesda
in Revised NPR Cases

Revised NPRs are later determinations that change the
reimbursement for a given cost-reporting period, made after the
intermediary reopens the original NPR to reconsider an aspect, or
aspects, thereof.92 Such revised NPRs are subject to PRRB review,
in accordance with the regulations set forth in 42 C.FR. Subpart
R. 93 In many PRRB cases arising out of revised NPRs, providers
attempted to raise issues decided in the original NPR but not
addressed in the revised NPR. Provider success in obtaining review
of such issues is dependent in large part on the scope of the
reopening.
Almost invariably, when a provider raises an issue that was not
revisited during the reopening which led to the revised NPR, the
courts hold that subsection (d) is inapplicable.9 4 The prevailing
judicial analysis in this setting examines the interplay between the
statutory framework of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo, establishing the PRRB
and setting forth its powers in regard to the intermediary's original
reimbursement determination for a given cost-reporting period, and
the regulatory scheme of 42 C.FR. §§ 405.1885-89, providing for
reopenings to reconsider that original determination and
subsequent Board review of the revised NPRs. Subsection
(a)(1)(A)(i) only describes original, not revised NPRs; accordingly,
the analysis focuses on the regulations providing for review of
92. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1889 (2000).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Albert Einstein Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan, 830 F Supp. 846 (E.D. Pa. 1992),
aff'd, 6 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993); HCA Health Ser. of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Shalala, 27 F3d 614
(D.C. Ci. 1994); French Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 89 F3d 1411 (9th Cir 1996). But see
Minn. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 703 F Supp. 780 (D. Minn. 1988).
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revised NPRs.9 5 As 42 C.ER. § 405.1899 only provides for review of
the revised NPR, the PRRB is without authority to review claims
not implicated by the reopening that led to the revised NPR.9 6
In addition to review of the statutory and regulatory text, judicial
analysis in this setting often invokes a policy basis for denying
review of issues that were settled in the original NPR and not
considered during the reopening that generated the revised NPR.
Permitting providers to raise any issue relating to the reopened
cost-reporting period, regardless of whether that issue was
reconsidered during the reopening, would thwart the policy of
finality embodied in the appeal deadline specified by the statute.97
The result is decidedly different when providers raise issues,
reconsidered during the reopening, but for which no
reimbursement change is made in the revised NPR. In this setting,
the courts have held that the provider can obtain Board review of
issues that were revisited as part of the process that results in the
revised NPR.98 The analysis in cases where an issue was raised
during the reopening, but not addressed in the revised NPR, is
remarkably similar to the Bethesda analysis of subsection (d) scope
of review in cases triggered by an original NPR. In both settings,
once a provider timely requests a hearing regarding a
reimbursement determination with which it is dissatisfied, the
Board's jurisdiction is properly invoked and its scope of review
extends to all matters that were subject to the intermediary's
review, regardless of whether the intermediary made an explicit
determination regarding the precise issue in question. 99
95. Albert Einstein, 830 F Supp. at 851; HCA, 27 F3d at 618-19; French Hospital, 89
E3d at 1418-19.
96. Id.
97. Albert Einstein, 830 F Supp. at 850; French Hospital, 89 F3d at 1420.
98. Edgewater Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 1123, 1134 (7th Cir. 1988), modified, 866
F2d 228 (1989); French Hospital, 89 E3d at 1420. See also Albert Einstein, 830 F Supp. at
848 (provider may appeal items "examined or changed" during reopening); Del. County
Mem'l Hosp. v. Sullivan, 836 F Supp. 238, 245 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (provider may appeal items
presented for review during the reopening). But see St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. v. Schweiker,
741 F2d 1447, 1449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (a pre-Bethesda opinion holding that the PRRB cannot
review claims presented during a reopening that do not result in revised reimbursement).
99. Compare Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 405, with Edgewater, 857 F2d at 1134 and French
Hospital, 89 E3d at 1420. Indeed, such parallel analysis is supported by similarities in the
text of the applicable statute and regulations. 42 C.YR. § 405.1889 provides for PRRB review
of revised NPRs pursuant to the regulations governing Board proceedings. 42 C.ER. §
405.1869 (1978) empowers the Board to include issues not previously considered by the
intermediary. Thus, consistent with the Bethesda analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d), that
similarly worded regulation should be read to include Board review of matters presented to
the intermediary during the reopening, regardless of whether the intermediary actually
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2. Later Judicial Interpretations of the Impact of Bethesda
on Appeals from Original NPRs
Three courts of appeals, the Seventh, D. C. and First Circuits,
have again analyzed Board jurisdiction and scope of review under
42 U.S.C. § 1395oo regarding hearings arising out of original
NPRs.100 Unfortunately, as with the prior split regarding
self-disallowance, the circuits have again drawn three different
conclusions as to the viability of the self-disallowance doctrine
after Bethesda. Somewhat remarkably, the courts of appeals for the
Seventh and D. C. Circuits now take views diametrically opposed
to their prior positions.
a.

The Seventh Circuit Adopts the Secretary's Limited
Reading of Bethesda

Both of the Seventh Circuit's post-Bethesda decisions adopt the
agency's position, focusing on the Bethesda Court's discussion of 42
U.S.C. § 1395oo(a). 10 1 Little Company I interpreted the Supreme
Court's discussion of subsection (a) as suggesting "that a hospital
that does not ask its intermediary to reimburse it for all of the
costs for which it is entitled to be reimbursed cannot, on appeal to
the Board, first ask for new costs."10 2 Accordingly, absent a
regulation or other rule precluding reimbursement, the PRRB, in a
case arising out of an original NPR, cannot review issues that had
not first been presented to the intermediary. °3
Noticeably absent from the Little Company I decision is any
analysis, or even mention, of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d). 1°4 The
reconsidered those issues and rendered a decision by revising the reimbursement related
thereto.
100. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctr. v. Shalala, 24 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1994)
("Little Company I"); Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctr. v. Shalala, 165 F.3d 1162
(7th Cir. 1999) ("Little Company I'D; HCA, 27 F3d at 614; Maine Gen. Med. Ctr. v. Shalala,
205 F.3d 493 (1st Cir. 2000), petitionfor reh'g denied, 2000 WL 656180 (1st Cir. No. 99-1085,
May 19, 2000).
101. Little Company I, 24 F.3d at 993; Little Company II, 165 F.3d at 1165.
102. Little Company I, 24 F.3d at 993.
103. The Seventh Circuit's Little Company I decision also rests on a separate analysis.
Id. at 989-90. The precise issue in that case was the proper assignment of DRGs under
Medicare's Prospective Payment System. Id. Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 412.60 (1985), a provider
has a separate route to challenge such DRG assignments. Id. The Little Company I court
qualified its holding regarding the scope of PRRB jurisdiction over original NPR appeals by
noting that the provider had failed to exhaust this separate administrative remedy. Id. at 993.
104. The failure to discuss subsection (d) is all the more puzzling given that, prior to
Bethesda, the Seventh Circuit relied on that subsection to reject the agency's
self-disallowance theory. See St. Mary, 698 F.2d at 1346.
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underlying district court decision did, however, address that
portion of the statute, finding that subsection (d) only permits the
Board "to adjust the cost reports in certain circumstances to
facilitate the remedy it imposes." 105 The provider could not,
according to the district court, employ subsection (d) to
"bootstrap" issues, not contested with the intermediary, into a
06
PRRB hearing triggered by the original NPR.'
The Little Company II decision follows the same pattern. The
Seventh Circuit's opinion again interprets the statutory language
discussing dissatisfaction as a requirement that the intermediary be
given the "first shot" at all issues, except those that are beyond the
"intermediary's competence."'0 7 This includes a requirement of
"pleading in the alternative" whereby providers must inform the
intermediaries of all possible alternative reimbursement theories. 0 8
Again the court did not discuss 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d). However,
the district court opinion below did address subsection (d), again
holding that the section only applies to the scope of review once
Board jurisdiction obtains and cannot be used to "bootstrap" new
°9
issues into a PRRB hearing.'
Thus, in both Little Company decisions, the Seventh Circuit did
not address 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d), and the district court opinions
cite Bethesda as support for the Secretary's limited reading of that
subsection."0 This, however, seems to be an overly restrictive view
of Bethesda, which provides that subsection (d) empowers the
Board "to review and revise a cost report with respect to matters
not contested before the fiscal intermediary.""' The district court
view in both cases conforms to the D. C. Circuit's prior
interpretation of subsection (d)."12 But the D.C. Circuit no longer
reads the statute in so restrictive a manner.
105. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctr. v. Shalala, 828 F Supp. 570 (N.D. WI.
1993), affd, 24 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1994).
106. Id. This case is a likely genesis of the later HCFA decisions that employ the same
"bootstrap" terminology. See Conemaugh, [1999-1 Transfer Binder]
80,126, at 200,483.
107. Little Company II, 165 F3d at 1165.
108.

Id. at 1166.

109. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctr. v. Shalala, 994 F Supp. 950, 961-62
(N.D. Ill 1993), affid, 165 E3d 1162 (7th Cir. 1999).
110. Little Company I, 828 F Supp. at 576 (citing Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 405-06); Little
Company II, 994 F Supp. at 962 (citing Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 405-06).
111.
112.

Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 406.
See Athens II, 743 F2d at 6.
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b. The D. C. Circuit Ascribes a Broad Reading to Bethesda
In HCA, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that Bethesda repudiated
its prior restrictive reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d) in cases arising
out of original NPRs. HCA analyzes Board jurisdiction and the
impact of subsection (d) in a case triggered by a revised NPR." 3
Confronted with a claim that subsection (d) controlled regarding
review in such cases, the D. C. Circuit acknowledged that, in cases
where Board jurisdiction and scope of review is governed by the
statute, a provider need not present a claim to the intermediary as
a prerequisite of Board review. The HCA panel analyzed the
statutory language, as construed in Bethesda, holding that "once
Board jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a) obtains, anything in
the original cost report is fair game for a challenge by virtue of
subsection (d)."" 4
However, HCA also found that cases arising out of revised NPRs
are controlled by the regulations, not by the statute; thus, the
provider's reliance on subsection (d) was unavailing as authority
for expansive Board jurisdiction and scope of review in a case
triggered by a revised NPR. The court held that the Board could
not hear issues decided in the original NPR that had not been
reconsidered during the reopening. 15
c. The First Circuit Renews Its DiscretionaryApproach to
Board Jurisdiction
The First Circuit recently confirmed that its prior views on PRRB
jurisdiction and scope of review set forth in St. Luke's - that is,
that the Board has discretion to review issues within the
intermediary's authority that were not first raised with the
intermediary - remain unchanged by Bethesda."6 The Maine
General majority characterized Bethesda and the prior decisions by
the various circuits, for example, St. Luke's, Adams House and
Athens II, as cases dealing with Board jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo as a whole, not just the dissatisfaction requirements of
subsection 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(i). 7 The majority held that the
Bethesda passage addressing dissatisfaction "is explicitly dictum
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

HCA, 27 F.3d at 617-18.
Id.
Id.
Maine General, 205 F.3d at 499-501.
Id. at 498-99.
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'those circumstances are not present here.' "118 Moreover, the
majority noted that "[tihe Secretary's position that 1395oo(a)
incorporates an unwaivable and unyielding exhaustion requirement
is essentially the same reading that the court rejected in Bethesda
as a 'strained interpretation . . inconsistent with the express
language of the statute.' "119
Accordingly, the Maine General majority concluded that
Bethesda did not undermine the St. Luke's analysis that a provider
could be dissatisfied (within the meaning of subsection (a)) without
first presenting a claim to the intermediary and that the Board
could (but was not required to) review claims which were not first
presented to the intermediary. 20 In so holding, the Maine General
majority found that the plain language of subsection (d) precluded
any deference to the Secretary's views and was careful to again
note the hybrid nature of the Board's role - " 'some features of
initial factfmding (witnesses, cross-examination, new evidence) and

some features of review.'

"121

The Maine General dissenting opinion rejects all three rationales
adopted by the majority. First, the dissent characterized St. Luke's
as precedent that focused solely on 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d) and did
122
not consider the dissatisfaction requirement of subsection (a).
Further, the dissent found the Secretary's reading of the statutory
term "dissatisfied" reasonable and thus entitled to Chevron
deference.'1' Finally, while the dissent agreed that the language in
Bethesda discussing dissatisfaction was obiter dictum, the dissent
viewed that passage as proof of the ambiguity in the statute that
124
mandated deference to the Secretary's position.
In its petition for rehearing, the agency argued that "[p]ermitting
providers to entirely bypass the intermediary's expertise in favor of
initial PRRB consideration of cost claims will have potentially
disastrous consequences for Medicare's carefully-constructed
system of review of such claims." 125 The majority rejected this
position, noting that the panel decision permitted the Board to
118.
119.
120.
statutory
842-43.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 499 (quoting Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 405).
Id. at 500 (quoting Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 404).
Id. at 499-501. Courts ordinarily defer to an agency interpretation of ambiguous
provisions that the agency is charged to implement. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
Maine Gen., 205 E3d at 500 (citing and quoting St. Luke's, 810 F2d at 328).
Id. at 503 (Cyr, J., dissenting).
Id. at 503-04 (Cyr, J., dissenting).
Id. at 504 (Cyr, J., dissenting).
Maine Gen., 2000 WL 656180.
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adopt a blanket procedural rule refusing to exercise its power to
hear such claims. 2 6
3.

The Impact of Bethesda on PRRB Jurisdiction to Review
an Intermediary's Refusal to Reopen a Settled Cost Report

The courts have also interpreted Bethesda when examining
whether PRRB jurisdiction extends to review of an intermediary's
refusal to reopen a cost report. 27 Initially, Bethesda was read to
support Board jurisdiction over refusals to reopen because the
Supreme Court had "rejected a restrictive reading of the Board's
jurisdiction."128 Later opinions rejected this position, viewing
Bethesda as an examination of the dissatisfaction necessary to
support a provider's right to a PRRB hearing upon receipt of a
reimbursement determination explicitly described by 42 U.S.C. §
1395oo(a).' 29 These courts found that analysis inapplicable to the
question of whether a refusal to reopen was itself a final
determination as to the amount of reimbursement due, a separate
jurisdictional prerequisite under subsection (a)(1)(A). 130 In addition,
the analysis focused on the policy favoring finality when providers
fail to request a Board hearing within the 180-day period specified
3
by the statute.' '
The Supreme Court has now resolved this dispute, finding that
an intermediary's refusal to reopen a prior NPR is not subject to
administrative or judicial review.'3 2 Without any mention of
Bethesda, the Visiting Nurse Court agreed with the Secretary that
a refusal to reopen is not a final reimbursement determination
described in and required by subsection (a)(1)(A). 1 In so holding,
the Court noted that the Medicare Act does not require any process
for correction of reimbursement errors discovered after an original
126. Id. (citing Maine Gen., 205 F3d at 501). Senior Judge Cyr again dissented and
would have granted rehearing on the rationale that self-disallowance is a valid exercise of
the agency's power to interpret 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo. Id.
127. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled by Your
Home Visiting Nurse Serv., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449 (1999); Mem'l Hosp. v. Sullivan, 779 F
Supp. 1406, 1408-09 (D.D.C. 1991); Good Samaritan Hosp. Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 894 F
Supp. 683, 689 (S.D.N.Y 1995), aff'd, 85 F3d 1057 (2d Cir. 1996); Binghamton Gen. Hosp. v.
Shalala, 856 F Supp. 786, 791 (S.D.N.Y 1994).
128. Oregon, 854 F.2d at 349 n.5.
129. Good Samaritan,894 F Supp. at 690 n.8; Binghamton, 856 F Supp. at 794 & n.5.
130. Id.
131. Mem'l Hospital, 779 F Supp. at 1409; Binghamton, 856 F Supp. at 795; Good
Samaritan,894 F Supp. at 690.
132. Visiting Nurse, 525 U.S. at 455-56.
133. Id.
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NPR becomes final.134 Finally, Visiting Nurse also invoked the
"traditional rule of administrative law that an agency's refusal to
reopen a closed case is generally 'committed to agency discretion
by law' and therefore exempt from judicial review."1 35 The Court
concluded that as the regulation that created the reopening process
did not also provide for review of an intermediary's refusal to
reopen an NPR, such a refusal was not subject to administrative or
36
judicial review.
V.

DELINEATING A UNIFIED THEORY OF BOARD JURISDICTION AND SCOPE

OF REVIEW UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo
As demonstrated above, the viability of self-disallowance as an
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo is driven, in large part, by the
initial analytical focus. Thus, those who advocate for
self-disallowance tend to focus on the dissatisfaction language in
subsection (a)(1)(A)(i), concluding that this provision is an implicit
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement mandating
presentation of all claims to the intermediary.1 37 On the other hand,
those that advocate for de novo review by the PRRB tend to focus
on subsection (d), finding therein the power for free ranging PRRB
review of any issue covered by the cost report.138 Perhaps the most
striking aspect of the history of this analytical dichotomy is the
juxtaposed pre-and post-Bethesda positions of the various circuits;
134. Id. (citing Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402 (1993)).
135. Id. (quoting ICC v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987)).
136. Visiting Nurse appears to reinvigorate the "bitter with the sweet" due process
analysis. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality opinion) (if a right is
accompanied by procedural limitations on the exercise thereof, those invoking the right
"must take the bitter with the sweet."). The concurring and dissenting Justices disagreed
with this analysis. See id. at 167 (Powell and Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (once a right is
created, due process attaches); id. at 188 (White, J., concurring and dissenting) (the state
may define rights but "the Constitution defines due process"); id. at 211 (Marshall, Douglass
and Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (bitter with the sweet approach renders due process
"inapplicable to the deprivation of any statutory benefit-any 'privilege' extended by
government-where a statute prescribed a termination procedure no matter how arbitrary or
unfair.") The Supreme Court later rejected this analysis: "it is settled that the 'bitter with the
sweet' approach misconceives the constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect
not to confer a property interest.., it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of
such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards." Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J,
concurring in part)). But Visiting Nurse revives this analysis, holding that, where the
regulation provides the right, the court should also look to the regulation for any review of
the exercise thereof. Visiting Nurse, 525 U.S. at 454.
137. See, e.g., Little Company H, 165 F.3d at 1165-66.
138. See, e.g., Maine Gen., 205 F.3d at 499-501.
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the Seventh Circuit, which originally rejected self-disallowance,
now supports the theory and the D. C. Circuit, which originally
accepted self-disallowance, now rejects that agency approach. 139
One guiding principle, made indisputably clear in Bethesda, is
that statutes must be construed as a whole. 40 An examination of
this statute as a whole, including provisions other than the
dissatisfaction requirement and the language describing the scope
of PRRB review, indicates that Congress intended that the Board
enjoy both appellate and de novo review powers. Moreover, the
regulations defining the intermediary's role also support this
construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo.
A. Deriving a Unified Theory of PRRB Review
1. The Statute Specifies the Cost Report, Not the NPR, as the
Subject of the PRRB Hearing
The validity of self-disallowance rests on the proposition that,
under subsection (a)(1)(A)(i), a provider can only be dissatisfied
with an intermediary's affirmative act to deny a provider's claim for
reimbursement.14 1 Thus, self-disallowance supporters conclude that
providers who cannot demonstrate this type of dissatisfaction can
never invoke the Board's jurisdiction and, therefore, can never
reach the broad scope of review specified in subsection (d).
This analysis, however, ignores other aspects of the statute. If
dissatisfaction with an intermediary's affimative act is the sine qua
non of Board review, then, logically, the subject of a Board hearing
would be the intermediary's determination, the NPR and the
underlying audit adjustments made to derive that NPR from the
cost report submitted by the provider. But the statute expressly
specifies a broader subject matter for PRRB hearings. As stated in
the introductory paragraph of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo, a provider that
timely files its cost report "may obtain a hearing with respect to
such cost report by" the PRRB. Restricting a Board hearing to
review of the NPR is a limitation that is inconsistent with this
statutory language.
139. Compare St. Mary, 698 F2d at 1346-47, with Little Company II, 165 E3d at
1164-65. Compare Athens II, 743 F.2d at 7-10, with HCA, 27 E3d at 617.
140. Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 405 (citing Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207,
220-21 (1986)).
141. See, e.g., Little Company II, 165 F.3d at 1165-66.
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2. Intermediary Inaction, as Well as the Issuance of the NPR,
Can Give Rise to Board Review

Dissatisfaction with the NPR issued by the intermediary is not
the only route to a PRRB hearing. Other subsections of the statute
permit providers to invoke the Board's jurisdiction if the
intermediary fails to timely render the NPR, whether based on the
142
original cost report or a properly filed supplemental cost report.
While 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395oo(a)(1)(B) and (C) require that the cost
report be filed in accordance with the applicable Medicare rules
and regulations, these subsections do not require dissatisfaction as
a jurisdictional prerequisite. Indeed, because no NPR has been
issued in these cases, the NPR cannot be the subject of the PRRB
hearing and Board jurisdiction cannot be limited to review of the
fiscal intermediary's reimbursement determination.'4
It seems anomalous to infer, when construing the statute as a
whole, that Congress intended to restrict PRRB review to the NPR
in cases where the provider awaits the intermediary's action, while
at the same time intending that the Board review be unfettered
regarding the cost reports of providers who seek review prior to
the issuance of an NPR. As dissatisfaction is not the only route to
the proper invocation of PRRB jurisdiction, dissatisfaction should
not be read as an expansive (albeit implicit) exhaustion of
remedies requirement that limits the Board's jurisdiction and scope
of review.
3. A Provider Can Be Dissatisfied with Its Total Amount of
Reimbursement Even If the Intermediary Makes No Audit
Adjustments to the As-Filed Cost Report
42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(i) does not require dissatisfaction
with an intermediary's decision to disallow a specific claim for
payment; it only requires that the provider be "dissatisfied with a
final determination of . . . its fiscal intermediary . . . as to the
amount of total program reimbursement due the provider .... "
The Bethesda Court, in obiter dicta, observed that a provider who
failed to request all available reimbursement in its cost report
might not be able to claim dissatisfaction if the intermediary simply
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(B), (C).
143. The legislative history of these alternative routes to a PRRB hearing indicates that
the only dissatisfaction required, if any, is dissatisfaction with an intermediary's failure to
act. See S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1605 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5370, 5387-88
(discussing Senate Amendments to House Bill).
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awarded reimbursement as claimed.'4 In addition, the Court also
characterized the Secretary's claim that the dissatisfaction provision
was an implicit exhaustion requirement as a "strained interpretation
...inconsistent with the express language of the statute."145 Thus,
Bethesda cannot be fairly characterized as explicitly resolving the
meaning of the dissatisfaction requirement; however, the Court's
later analysis of the broad scope of PRRB review is only consistent
4
with a broad reading of dissatisfaction. 1
At first blush, it may appear that the Secretary's contrary, more
restrictive interpretation of the dissatisfaction requirement is
entitled to deference. 47 But deference is not appropriate when, as
here, the statute addresses jurisdiction, a subject familiar to the
judiciary, rather than a technical Medicare reimbursement issue
requiring administrative expertise. 148 More importantly, the
Secretary is now not merely interpreting the statute; rather the
Secretary now offers her interpretation of the Bethesda decision.
Courts, rather than agencies, are the experts in interpreting judicial
precedent and, thus, no deference is due the Secretary's
post-Bethesda interpretation of the statute.
Moreover, the broader view of the dissatisfaction requirement
finds support in the regulations defining the intermediary's role in
the Medicare reimbursement process. Fiscal intermediaries "must
audit the records of providers of services as necessary to assure
proper payments."14 9 Payments are only proper if adjustments have
been made to correct for claims that will result in underpayments
as well as claims that will result in overpayments. Obviously, a
provider can be just as dissatisfied with an intermediary's failure to
make an adjustment to correct an understated claim as it can be
with an intermediary's adjustment that improperly reduces a
correctly stated claim. 50 Indeed, at least prior to the
144. Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 405.
145. Id. at 404.
146. Id. at 405-06 (internal citation omitted).
147. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (courts defer to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes); Maine Gen., 205 F.3d at 503-04 (Judge Cyr, dissenting, asserting that the
Secretary's interpretation of the dissatisfaction provision is entitled to judicial deference).
148. See Wash. Hosp. Ctr. v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 147 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discussing
PRRB jurisdiction). But see French Hosp., 89 F.3d at 1416 n.6 (expressly disavowing prior
statements (Adams House, 817 F2d at 592) that no deference is due an agency's
interpretation of jurisdictional provision in a statute).
149. 42 C.FR. § 421.100(c) (1982). An agency is bound by the plain language of its
regulations. See, e.g., United States ex re. Farese v. Luther, 953 F2d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 1992).
150. In at least one PRRB case, an intermediary employee testified that the
intermediaries are obligated to make adjustments that result in proper payment regardless of
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commencement of a PRRB hearing, the intermediary acts as the
provider's advisor, not an adversary. 15 1 Thus, even if a provider
mistakenly fails to articulate a claim for proper payment, the
regulations require that the fiscal intermediary correct that mistake
to assure proper payment. 15 2
4. The PRRB's Fact-FindingPowers Support De Novo Board
Review
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395oo(c) and (d) lend further support to the de
novo review theory. As noted above, subsection (d) empowers the
Board to revise "matters covered by the cost report . . . even
though such matters were not considered by the intermediary"
when rendering the NPR. Subsection (d) also provides that the
record before the PRRB "shall include the evidence considered by
the intermediary and such other evidence as may be obtained or
received by the Board." Similarly, subsection (c) guarantees
providers the right "to introduce evidence and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses." Such initial fact-finding powers are more
consistent with de novo review than with a purely appellate

function. '- 3
5. The PRRB Cannot Refuse to Hear Self-Disallowed Issues
In addition, the PRRB cannot adopt a blanket rule refusing to
exercise its power over self-disallowed issues once a provider
properly invokes Board jurisdiction. As the Ninth Circuit has twice
noted, the opening paragraph of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo entitles a
provider to a PRRB hearing.'1 Indeed, under the First Circuit's
view that it is permissible for the Board to adopt rules limiting the
issues it will hear, the Board could, in theory, adopt a rule refusing
to hear any claim, whether self-disallowed or first presented to the
whether the adjustment favors the Medicare program or favors the provider. "Q. My question
is, is it your position that if the Provider makes a mistake that hurts the Provider, the
Provider is bound by what it submitted? A. No. I think it works both ways." Transcript
Excerpt, PRRB Case No. 91-2673M, 6/12/96 Hearing at 1834 (on fie with the author).
151. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 95 (1995) (citing 42 C.ER. § 413.20).
152. Allowing PRRB review of issues arising out of an intermediary's failure to fulfill its
obligation to discover and correct reporting errors that result in underpayment is consistent
with a statutory scheme that permits a PRRB hearing based on other intermediary failures,
such as the failure to timely issue an NPR. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(B), (C).
153. St. Luke's, 810 F2d at 329. See also H.R. REP. No. 92-231 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5309 (explaining the Board's fact-finding role and its power to make
"revisions involving matters not considered by the intermediary").
154. Adams House, 817 F.2d at 594; Adams House II, 862 F.2d at 1375-76.
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intermediary.5 5 That result is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
statement that, once the Board's jurisdiction is properly invoked,
the only limitation on issues which the provider may present for
review is that the "matter must have been 'covered by the cost
report,' that is, a cost or expense that was incurred within the
period for which the cost report was filed, even if such cost or
expense was not expressly claimed."'6
6.

Construing the Statute as a Whole as a Case Moves
Through the PRRB Process

Construing the statute as a whole, the various provisions of 42
U.S.C. § 1395oo must be examined in the context of a PRRB case
as it proceeds from the initial stages of jurisdictional review
through the hearing process. Conemaugh provides a striking
example of the contrast in the competing statutory interpretations
as applied in this setting.
As described by the PRRB, the Conemaugh provider initially
invoked PRRB jurisdiction by challenging three separate audit
adjustments made by the intermediary, the negative reimbursement
effects of which were reflected in the original NPR.157 Prior to the
hearing, the provider raised two additional issues, one of which
had not been presented to the intermediary in the cost report as
originally filed.1M The PRRB's decision tracked the statute - the
provider timely and properly requested a hearing "and therefore the
Board ha[d] jurisdiction over the Provider's . . . cost report."'1 9 As
the later-raised issue was covered by the cost report, that issue was
"subject to Board review by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d)." 160 This
analysis tracks Bethesda; the statutory structure:
[A]llows the Board, once it obtains jurisdiction pursuant to
subsection (a), to review and revise a cost report with respect
to matters not contested before the fiscal intermediary. The
155. Maine Gen., 205 F3d at 501.
156. Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 406 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(d)).
157. Conemaugh, [1998-1 Transfer Binder]
80,074, at 200,376.
158. Id. See also Stipulation and Request to Proceed on the Record, PRRB Case No.
95-0100, 7/28/98 (on file with the author). 42 C.FR. § 405.1841(a)(1) (1988) permits providers
to raise new issues at any time prior to the commencement of the Board hearing. The HCFA
itself previously admitted that, pursuant to this regulation governing the form of PRRB
hearings, once the Board assumes jurisdiction, "it is the cost year that is open and not the
individual issue." French Hosp., 89 E3d at 1421 (quoting St. Mary's Hosp. v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Ass'n (HCFA Adrn'r, May 5, 1983)).
159. Conemaugh, [1998-1 Transfer Binder] 80,074, at 200,380.
160. Id.
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only limitation prescribed by Congress is that the matter must
have been "covered by such cost report," that is, a cost or
expense that was incurred within the period for which the
cost report was filed, even if such cost or expense was not
161
expressly claimed.
Now contrast the HCFA Administrator's Conemaugh decision
vacating for lack of jurisdiction. The intermediary claimed that the
"Board only has jurisdiction over final determinations of the
Intermediary."162 The Administrator agreed, stating that subsection
(a) entitles a provider to a Board hearing "with respect to its fiscal
intermediary's determination of its cost report."lra Once the subject
of the PRRB hearing is limited to the intermediary's determination,
it is logical to conclude, as did the Administrator, that any attempt
to use the scope of review provisions set forth at subsection (d) to
include issues that were not first presented to the intermediary is
T M This limited view of the meaning of
impermissible bootstrapping.'
subsection (d) can only be squared with the broad reading
accorded that provision in Bethesda by further limiting that case to
the facts presented therein.65 But this reading is premised on
limiting the subject matter of the PRRB hearing to the NPR, a
limitation that is inconsistent with the opening paragraph of the
statute that specifies the cost report, not the intermediary's
determination thereof, as the subject matter of the hearing.M
7.

A Unified Theory of PRRB Jurisdiction and Scope of
Review

Construing the statute as a whole, self-disallowance must fail.
The PRRB can obtain jurisdiction over the cost report under any
subsection of 1395oo(a)(1). Dissatisfaction with an intermediary's
determination is simply not a prerequisite to PRRB review under
subsection (a)(1)(B) or (a)(1)(C).
In addition, the rationales offered to support self-disallowance
when analyzing 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(A) in isolation simply do
not bear scrutiny. The original rationale, a purported inability to
161. Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 405. Indeed, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a), this
passage refers to the subject of the Board hearing as the cost report, not the NPR or the
intermediary's audit adjustments.
162. Conemaugh, [1999-1 Transfer Binder]
80,126, at 200,482.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 200,483. See also Little Company II, 165 F.3d at 1165.
165. Conemaugh, [1999-1 Transfer Binder] 80,126, at 200,482.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a).
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claim dissatisfaction, is refuted by the intermediary's regulatory
obligation to ensure proper payment. 16 7 The Secretary recently
advanced two new rationales: The need for intermediary expertise
regarding self-disallowed claims and the purported unmanageability
of the system if self-disallowance is not upheld.'6 However, the
PRRB will obtain the benefit of the intermediary's expertise by the
intermediary's participation as a party to the Board hearing. 69 And,
if anything is unmanageable, it is the alternative cost report model
specified in Little Company II.170 The cost report is an
extraordinarily complex document; changes in one area often
produce ripple reimbursement and statistical effects that flow
throughout the filing. Given the agency's claims regarding
administrative burdens, it seems highly unlikely that intermediaries
are equipped and prepared to review the multitude of cost report
permutations that would occur if a provider is forced to protect its
right to proper payment by specifying every alternative theory of
reimbursement in the initial filing.
Finally, assuming that a challenge to an intermediary's affirmative
act of disallowing a claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite, then all a
provider must do is timely challenge an NPR that results from one
or more audit adjustments, made by the intermediary, with a
negative reimbursement impact of $10,000 or more. In the author's
experience, a provider has little or no difficulty finding an audit
adjustment or some other intermediary action with which it is
"dissatisfied" to invoke PRRB jurisdiction. The Board hearing,
however, is then held with respect to the cost report, not the NPR
or any specific audit adjustment. 17' Once the cost report has been
brought before the PRRB for review, the scope of the Board's
review is governed solely by subsection (d). Pursuant thereto, the
only limitation on the scope of review is that issues arise from "a
cost or expense that was incurred within the period for which the
cost report was filed, even if such cost or expense was not
expressly claimed." 172
Given this framework, a unified theory of PRRB review can be
stated as follows: The PRRB has jurisdiction over all claims
covered by the cost report, or the reopened portion(s) thereof, that
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See 42 C.YR. § 421.100(c) (1991).
Maine Gen., 2000 WL at 656180.
See 42 C.YR. § 405.1843 (1991).
165 F3d at 1166.
Id.
Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 405.
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were before the fiscal intermediary when the NPR (original or
revised) was issued. This theory could be analyzed in the following
sequence:
(1)

A provider must timely file its cost report summarizing
its costs and claims for the cost reporting period at issue
(42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)), or the provider must timely fie a
supplemental cost report (42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(C)).
(2) The provider can then obtain a PRRB hearing if:
* The intermediary delays the issuance of the NPR (42
U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(B)-(C)); or
* The provider is dissatisfied with the reimbursement
specified in the NPR (42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(i)).
A provider can be dissatisfied with:
*
The intermediary's affirmative act of disallowing
a claim; or
*
The intermediary's failure, during the audit, to
ensure proper payment by detecting and
correcting a provider error (42 C.FR. §
421.100(c)).
(3) As long as the provider timely requests a hearing and the
amount in controversy is more than $10,000, the Board
assumes jurisdiction over the cost report (42 U.S.C. §
1395oo(a)),
or the reopened
portion(s)
thereof
(Edgewater, 857 F.2d at 1134; French Hospital, 89 F3d at
1420).
(4) The Board's scope of review in cases triggered by original
NPRs extends to any reimbursement claim arising out of
or related to the cost-reporting period (42 U.S.C. §
1395oo(d)). The scope of review in cases triggered by
revised NPRs extends to any reimbursement claim
reconsidered during the reopening (42 C.FR. § 405.1869;
see also Edgewater, 857 F.2d at 1134; French Hospital, 89
17
F3d at 1420). 3

173. The PRRB also hears disputes arising out of decisions that conclude separate
requests for administrative relief that can be initiated once the NPR has been issued. See,
e.g., 42 C.FR. § 413.40(e), (g) (1998) (providers can obtain PRRB hearings regarding
decisions on requests, filed within 180 days of the NPR, for cost-ceiling adjustments in
PPS-exempt units). Applying the theory in such cases, the scope of Board review and
available relief would be controlled by the range of the reimbursement matters open before
the intermediary during the process that led to the NPR that triggered the subsequent
request for administrative relief.
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To effectuate the fmality concerns arising from the
limitation on time to request a hearing (42 U.S.C. §
1395oo(a)(3)), Board hearings are limited to
reimbursement claims covered by the cost report, or in
revised NPR cases, the reopened portion(s) of the cost
report. Thus, a provider cannot use a request for a Board
hearing regarding later years to resurrect reimbursement
claims pertaining to prior cost-reporting periods. Nor can
a provider use a Board hearing regarding a revised NPR
to resurrect reimbursement claims from that specific
cost-reporting period which were not within the scope of
the reopening that led to the revised NPR. The Board
may hear only those reimbursement claims that were
open before the intermediary and could have been
considered during the process that generated the NPR,
original or revised.
Once before the PRRB, the provider may introduce new
evidence regarding the costs incurred during the period
covered by the cost report (42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(c) & (d))
or the reopened portion(s) thereof (42 C.FR. § 405.1869).
The intermediary also presents the PRRB with the benefit
of its expertise regarding the issues addressed in the
Board hearing (42 C.FR. § 405.1843).

B. Application of the Unified Theory to Various NPR Scenarios
Deriving a uniform reading of the statute is only the first step.
That reading must then be applied to the various reimbursement
determinations that trigger a request for a PRRB hearing. As set
forth above, this article examines the Board's powers in three such
settings: (1) a hearing requested following receipt of the original
NPR setting forth the total Part A reimbursement due for a given
cost-reporting period; (2) a hearing requested following receipt of a
revised NPR, after a cost reporting period has been reopened and
the amount of the reimbursement paid for that period has been
altered; and (3) a hearing requested following an intermediary's
refusal to reopen a cost-reporting period.
1. The Scope of Board Review in OriginalNPR Cases
When a provider timely seeks a Board hearing after receipt of
the original NPR for a cost-reporting period, the Board's scope of
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review is almost unlimited. 174 As shown above, the jurisdictional
requirement is met by dissatisfaction with the total amount of
reimbursement awarded, whether the result of an intermediary's
improperly disallowed claim or of a flawed intermediary audit that
failed to detect and correct a provider reporting error. In addition,
cases triggered by original NPRs do not implicate the preference
for finality because, as a hearing was requested within 180 days of
the original NPR, the reimbursement determination process has
not, in any way, become final.' 75 Thus, the entire cost report is
made subject to Board review and, as stated in Bethesda, PRRB
review extends to all costs or expenses "incurred within the period
for which the cost report was filed, even if such cost or expense
was not expressly claimed."' 7 6 Moreover, as the provider is
statutorily entitled to a PRRB hearing, the Board must hear issues
77
raised by the provider, including self-disallowed claims.'
2. The Scope of Board Review in Revised NPR Cases
The Board's powers are more limited in hearings requested
following a revised NPR. In such cases, the preference for finality
is somewhat implicated because the provider could have, but did
not request a Board hearing after receipt of the original NPR. Thus,
absent a reopening, the statutory appeal period would act as a bar
to any review of reimbursement claims for that cost-reporting
period. 7 8 However, the preference for finality is not an absolute
and should not outweigh other considerations once a cost report
174. The statute itself specifies two issues that are beyond PRRB review: A finding that
expenses relate to items of services for which reimbursement is statutorily excluded and
certain DRG classification methodologies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(g).
175. Once the Board assumes jurisdiction, "it is the cost year that is open and not the
individual issue .... ." French Hosp., 89 F3d at 1421 (quoting St. Mary's Hosp. v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Ass'n (HCFA Adm'r, May 5, 1983)). See also ProviderReimbursement Manual
§ 2930.1.A ("An intermediary's initial determination (Notice of Amount of Program
Reimbursement) becomes final and binding upon the expiration of 180 calendar days after
the date of the mailing of the notice, unless before that time the provider (entity) requests a
hearing, or a late-fied request is accepted for good cause.").

176. Bethesda, 485 U.S. at 405.
177. See, e.g., Adams House II, 862 F.2d at 1374-75. The Board is, however, empowered
to create rules that govern its proceedings. In this respect, concerns regarding administrative
efficiency might be better served by reconsideration of the point in the proceedings by
which the provider must raise all issues presented for review. 42 C.FR. § 405.1841(a)(1) now
permits the provider to raise issues at any time prior to the commencement of the hearing.
Considerations of equity and efficiency might be better served if the provider had to raise all
issues at least six months in advance of the hearing date, thus allowing the PRRB staff and
counsel for the intermediary to more fully address all the issues presented for adjudication.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3).
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has been reopened.
In this revised NPR setting, even the Secretary agrees that Board
review extends to those issues for which reimbursement is actually
revised. 179 However, the Board's authority should not be limited to
the items for which reimbursement was revised. Rather, sound
policy reasons establish that the Board's authority extends to all
reimbursement claims arising out of the portions of the cost report
that were reopened, regardless of whether the amount of
reimbursement was actually revised.
First, when an agency reopens a proceeding and then issues a
new and final order regarding the matter, that order is generally
reviewable on the merits "even if it merely reaffirms the rights and
obligations set forth in the original order."80 Thus, once a portion
of a cost report has been reopened, review is governed by the
scope of the reopening, regardless of whether the reopening results
in revised reimbursement. 8 1
Second, permitting Board review of matters reopened, but not
revised, in such hearings does not run afoul of the Supreme Court's
admonition, in Visiting Nurse, that as the reopening process is
created by regulation, review of reopening decisions must also be
grounded in the regulations. 8 2 42 C.FR. § 405.1889 specifies the
revised NPR as a separate determination that triggers a right to
Board review. But the broad scope of review specified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395oo(d) is repeated in the regulations governing Board
proceedings, which describe the Board's review as extending to
reimbursement matters that "were not considered in the
intermediary's determination." m8 Indeed, it seems indisputable that
179. 42 C.FR. § 405.1889 (1996).
180. ICC v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 278 (1987). See also Visiting Nurse,
525 U.S. at 455 (citing Locomotive Eng'rs as stating the general rule of review for
administrative decisions).
181. Intermediaries ordinarily provide notice of which portions of a cost report are
being reopened, the reasons for the reopening and permit the provider to submit evidence
regarding the reopening. 42 C.FR. § 405.1887 (1996). See also Provider Reimbursement
Manual § 2932.A182. Visiting Nurse, 525 U.S. at 454. See also HCA, 27 F.3d at 619 (in cases triggered
by revised NPRs, PRRB jurisdiction and scope of review is governed by the regulations, not
the enabling statute).
183. Even if these regulations did not track the statute, serious questions would exist
as to the agency's ability to provide for a Board hearing then restrict Board review. An
agency cannot confer jurisdiction in excess of the authority specified in the statute creating
a tribunal. See, e.g., St. Joseph's Hosp. of Kansas City v. Heckler, 786 F2d 848, 853 (8th Cir.
1986); Ozark Mountain Reg'l Rehabilitation Ctr. v. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 798 F
Supp. 16, 19-20 (D.D.C. 1992). Thus, PRRB hearings triggered by revised NPRs that result
from reopenings can only be valid if such hearings are within the framework established by
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a provider can be dissatisfied, within the meaning of the
regulations governing Board hearings, with an intermediary's failure
to revise reimbursement regarding a portion of the cost report that
4
has been reopened to consider reimbursement revisions.'1
Finally, as the Seventh Circuit noted in Edgewater, providers
often seek reopenings to obtain reimbursement revisions. 185 In this
setting, it is illogical to afford Board review of those matters in
which the provider has prevailed and obtained a reimbursement
revision, yet deny review of those items which the intermediary has
reopened, reconsidered, yet refused to revise. 8 6 Simply put, in
cases triggered by revised NPRs, Board review is limited to the
scope of the matters reopened, not the claims for which
reimbursement was actually revised.
3. Board Review of an Intermediary's Refusal to Reopen a
NPR
The balance shifts once a provider fails to timely request a Board
hearing regarding an original NPR and the intermediary refuses to
reopen reimbursement for that cost-reporting period. In this setting,
the Supreme Court has determined that, unlike review of matters
where a reopening has occurred, where the intermediary refuses to
reopen the NPR, the interest in finality outweighs the provider's
right to proper reimbursement and the decision is not subject to
administrative or judicial review.'87 While proper reimbursement is
thus dependent on the proper exercise of the intermediary's
discretion, it is the provider's failure to timely seek a Board hearing
42 U.S.C. § 1395oo. Once the statute applies, it does so in its entirety, including the broad
scope of review specified by subsection (d). However, as 42 C.YR. § 405.1869 reiterates the
broad powers conferred by the statute, the regulations can be easily construed as in accord
with, not in contravention of, the statute they implement
184. 42 C.ER. § 405.1889 specifies 42 C.F.R. § 405.1835 as the regulation governing
hearings regarding revised NPRs. In turn, 42 C.YR. § 405.1835(a)(2) specifies 42 C.YR. §
405.1841(a)(1) as the provision governing a request for a Board hearing. That regulation, in
turn, specifies dissatisfaction with some aspect of the intermediary's determination as an
element of a request for a hearing. 42 C.ER. § 405.1841(a)(1) (1988). In this regard,
dissatisfaction with an intermediary's failure to revise reimbursement as requested regarding
a reopened issue parallels the dissatisfaction that arises when an intermediary fails to detect
and correct a provider reporting error, thereby failing to assure proper payment as required
by 42 C.F.R. § 421.100(c).
185. Edgewater, 857 F2d at 1136-37.
186. Id. See also French Hosp., 89 F.3d at 1420.
187. Visiting Nurse, 525 U.S. at 455. See also Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 270
(generally discussing refusals to reopen administrative proceedings).
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regarding the original NPR that generates this resultlrs
CONCLUSION

Read as a whole, 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo clearly provides that the
PRRB is more than just an appellate body that reviews the audit
adjustments made by the fiscal intermediary in rendering an NPR.
The Board's fact-finding powers, expressly conferred by statute, are
inconsistent with a purely appellate function. Moreover, the
alternative routes to a PRRB hearing specified in the statute do not
require dissatisfaction with an intermediary's determination as a
jurisdictional prerequisite. Finally, the statutorily specified scope of
review clearly empowers the Board to hear issues that were not
first presented to the fiscal intermediary, and the regulations
expressly provide that the intermediary's views on all issues will be
aired during the PRRB hearing.
The Bethesda Court found the Secretary's original
188. Although the interest in finality is significant, denying review of refusals to reopen
will, in the author's opinion, increase the PRRB's caseload. Visiting Nurse depicts few
intermediaries hard-pressed to identify overpayments, while each of the almost innumerable
providers can "easily identify underpayments within 180 days of the NPR." 525 U.S. at 456.
The Court also saw no defect in a reopening process that only corrected overpayments while
underpayments went unredressed, and accepted the claim, apparently unsupported by the
record, that intermediaries grant 30% to 40% of reopening requests. Id. But even if providers
are better situated to identify errors, reimbursement claims often arise from precedent
decided after the 180-day period expires. See, e.g., Little Company II, 165 F.3d at 1165 (claim
based on recent Supreme Court authority). Moreover, when acquiescing in such decisions,
the HCFA does not always reopen prior NPRs to make proper payment. See HCFA Ruling
No. 97-2, February 2, 1997, reprinted in [1997-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) 45,105 (ordering settlement of cases challenging disproportionate share hospital rule
declared invalid by the courts but prohibiting the reopening of other settled cost reports to
correct underpayments). After Visiting Nurse, no prudent provider will rely on the
reopening process. Rather, well-advised providers will request a PRRB hearing as to every
original NPR, then add issues under 42 C.FR. § 405.1841(a)(1) as they are identified,
ultimately resulting in additional hearing requests that further clog the PRRB's already
crowded docket.
This result could have been avoided by acknowledging that a reopening request, which can
be filed up to three years after the NPR was issued, is analogous to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
motion for relief from judgment, which can be filed up to one year after judgment was
entered. Indeed, many of the Rule 60(b) grounds for relief (e.g., mistake, new evidence and
fraud) are specified in Provider Reimbursement Manual § 2932.1 as grounds for reopening.
A Rule 60(b) motion does not replace a timely appeal (Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S.
193, 197 (1950)), but Rule 60(b) rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Bowder v. Dep't
of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978). As the NPR is the initial Medicare
reimbursement determination, the operation of Rule 60(b) appears to be the appropriate
analogy for review of a refusal to reopen an NPR. But rather than Rule 60(b) motions, that
are reviewable on appeal, the Supreme Court equated requests for administrative reopening
to petitions for reconsideration by an appellate court, that are not subject to further review.
Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 278 (cited in Visiting Nurse, 525 U.S. at 455).
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self-disallowance theory a strained interpretation that was
inconsistent with the statutory scheme when construed as a whole.
Similarly, the Secretary's attempts to limit Bethesda to those
instances when the intermediary is without authority to rule on the
issue presented is a strained interpretation that is inconsistent with
that decision when read as a whole. If, as the regulations provide,
the Secretary intends to ensure proper payment to providers for
services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries, the unnecessary
procedural barrier raised by the self-disallowance theory should be
discarded.

